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Recent Decisions
Adoption - Age And Religion Of Adoptive Parents.
Frantum v. Department of Public Welfare, 133 A. 2d 408
(Md., 1957). A two month old baby, in poor physical con-
dition, was placed in the home of the petitioner, husband
and wife, ages 54 and 48, respectively, for foster care. The
petitioners nursed the child back to health and filed suit
to adopt after the Department of Welfare refused to con-
sent. The Probation Department of the court recommended
the adoption. Petitioners were of the Lutheran faith, but
the Catholic mother of the child had requested the child
be reared a Catholic. The chancellor dismissed the petition
primarily because of the advanced age of the foster parents;
secondarily, because of the religious difference. The order
was affirmed (4-1) on appeal. While Maryland law has
established only a minimum - and not a maximum - age
for adoptive parents, the age of the prospective parents was
an important factor. It was held to be in the child's best
interests to be placed in the home of younger parents, even
though the petitioners were found to be "fine people", had
given the child love and affection and had done an "excel-
lent job" in nursing the baby back to good health. More-
over, it is the declared legislative policy of the state that
the adoption be by persons of the same religious belief as
the minor or his parents "whenever practicable", Md. Code
Supp. (1957), Art. 16, Sec. 76. The Court pointed out that
this statutory provision was not mandatory but held it prac-
ticable, nevertheless, to apply it in this case. (Ed. Note:
Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, Nov. 25, 1957).
This is the first adoption case in Maryland where the
age of the prospective parents has been considered such an
important factor. Ex parte Anderson, 199 Md. 316, 86 A. 2d
516 (1952), cited by the Court as authority for this prin-
ciple, denied an adoption petition almost exclusively on the
bases that the petitioner was high strung and had retarded
the development of the child. In reference to the question
of religion, Purinton v. Jamrock, 195 Mass. 187, 80 N. E. 802
(1907), construed a statute similar to the one in Maryland
as preferring the welfare of the child to the wishes of the
natural parents, and allowed the adoption. Cases denying
adoption on this ground are collected in 23 A. L. R. 2d 702
(Supp. Serv. 1957, 1422).
Corporations - By-Law Restricting Transfer Of Stock
Must Be Stated On Certificate. Hopwood v. Topsham Tele-
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phone Co., 132 A. 2d 170 (Vt., 1957). Plaintiff purchased 2
shares of stock of defendant corporation and brought an
equity suit to compel defendant to transfer title to him on
its books. Defendant resisted the suit on the grounds that
the plaintiff, at the time of acquisition, had knowledge of
non-compliance with the corporation's by-law, which pro-
hibited the sale of any stock before first being offered for
sale to the board of directors. By Vermont statute, Ver-
mont St. (1947), Sec. 5880, there shall be no restriction on
the transfer of stock unless said restriction is stated on the
certificate. No restrictions were stated on the shares in
question. The trial court's grant of relief to plaintiff was
affirmed on appeal. The statutory requirement is absolute
and is not limited to good faith purchasers without notice.
Notice cannot take the place of compliance with the statute.
Decisions in at least two states are contra, Baumohl v.
Goldstein, 95 N. J. Eq. 597, 124 Atl. 118 (1924), and Doss v.
Yingling, 95 Ind. App. 494, 172 N. E. 801 (1930), holding
that this statutory requirement is not for the protection of
purchasers having notice of the corporation's by-law re-
stricting the stock's transferability. 6 U. L. A., Stock Trans-
fer, Sec. 15. Both of these cases were distinguished by the
Vermont court because in each instance the purchaser was
an officer of the corporation and thus stood in a fiduciary
relationship to the other stockholders. The statute here in-
volved is part of the Uniform Stock Transfer Act, Md. Code
(1951), Art. 23, Sec. 110, and has not yet been construed by
the Maryland Court of Appeals.
Husband And Wife - Husband's Liability For Wife's
Attorney's Fees In Divorce Suit - Effect Of Reconciliation.
In Re De Pass, 97 S. E. 2d 505 (S. C., 1957). A month after a
wife instituted divorce proceedings against her husband,
they were reconciled and the wife notified her attorney to
withdraw the suit. The attorney petitioned the court to
award him attorney's fees as against the husband before
dismissing the case. The trial court refused the request,
and the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed. To
allow the award, which would necessarily require the con-
tinuance of the litigation against the will of the parties,
would contravene public policy, which is to induce recon-
ciliation. The decision is in accord with the rule in a ma-
jority of jurisdictions. Several states, however, allow con-
tinuance of a divorce suit after reconciliation for the sole
purpose of decreeing attorney's fees of wife. See 45 A. L. R.
941, supplemented in 59 A. L. R. 355, discussing this conflict.
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Although this point has never been specifically decided
in Maryland, the Court of Appeals in McCurley v. Stock-
bridge, 62 Md. 422 (1884), sustained an action by a wife's
attorney, in an independent suit against her deceased hus-
band's estate, for counsel fees incurred by the wife in her
divorce action, which was terminated by her husband's
death and before any decree was issued. The prosecution
of a reasonably justifiable divorce suit against husband is
one of the "necessaries" of wife that is chargeable to hus-
band. The general rule in the United States is contra, not
allowing this type of recover by an attorney even in an in-
dependent suit against husband. See 25 A. L. R. 354, 42
A. L. R. 315.
Liens - Status Of Judgment Creditor As Against
Administrator. Smith v. Citizens National Bank In Okmul-
gee, 313 P. 2d 505 (Okla., 1957). An heir was indebted to the
deceased for an amount greater than his distributive share.
The administrator claimed set-off and refused to give him
a share in the estate. Plaintiff, a judgment creditor of the
heir, filed suit to compel the distribution of the heir's one-
fourth share in real property, since his judgment had been
docketed before the death of the intestate. The trial court's
dismissal of the petition and distribution to the other heirs
was reversed by the intermediate court but reinstated by
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma. Under Oklahoma statute
intestate real and personal property passed through the
administrator and as a result the distributive share was
subject to a set-off of any amount owed by the heir to the
deceased. This equitable lien was superior to that of ajudgment creditor.
The jurisdictions appear to be about equally divided on
this point. Courts adopting the orthodox theory, that realty
passes at once to the heir, do not give the administrator
such a lien; whereas in those states requiring intestate
realty to pass through probate, the courts feel justified in
giving the administrator a preferred lien before granting
the heir his distributive share. 3 AEi. LAw OF PROPERTY
(1952) Sec. 14.26. Cf, TuRENTNE, WILLS AND ADMINIsTRA-
TION (1954).
In Maryland in the case of intestacy title to land vests in
the heirs immediately upon the ancestor's death. Rowe v.
Cullen, 177 Md. 357, 9 A. 2d 585 (1939). Therefore, in Mary-
land the administrator should be in the same position as
every other creditor. It is well settled that as among credi-
tors, the one with the prior judgment lien prevails; Mes-
singer v. Eckenrode, 162 Md. 63, 158 A. 357 (1932).
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Option - What Constitutes An Acceptance. Hunter
Investment v. Divine Engineering, 83 N. W. 2d 921 (Iowa,
1957). The parties entered into a five-year lease giving the
lessee a two-year option to purchase, the rentals paid to
the date of the exercise of the option to be applied to the
purchase price. Before the expiration date, the lessee told
the lessor, "We are going to exercise the option." The lessor
refused to discuss the matter. No further action was taken
until more than a year after the expiration date, when the
lessor filed suit to quiet title to the premises and the lessee
counterclaimed for specific performance of the option. The
lower court's decree in the lessor's favor was affirmed on
appeal. The acceptance of an option must be unqualified
and unequivocal. Lessee's actions indicated only a possible
future intent to purchase.
In Foard v. Snider, 205 Md. 435, 109 A. 2d 101 (1954),
the optionee wrote the owner a letter which (1) expressed
an intention to purchase and purported to be an exercise
of the option right, (2) demanded that the owner give up
possession of the land, but (3) refused to pay part of the pur-
chase price called for by the agreement. The Court allowed
the optionee to purchase the land but required him to pay
the total stipulated purchase price. However, the question
was avoided as to the sufficiency of this letter as an effectual
acceptance of the option, because this issue had not been
raised in the pleadings. Trotter v. Lewis, 185 Md. 528, 45
A. 2d 329 (1946) held that tender of the purchase price
constituted due acceptance of an option. The Maryland
cases emphasize that in addition to being "positive and un-
equivocal", the act purporting to be an exercise of the
option (like any acceptance of an offer of contract) must
be that act which the option prescribes as an acceptance
or exercise.
Tenancy In Common - Tax Sale - Wife Of Co-Tenant
As Purchaser. Beers v. Pusey, 132 A. 2d 346 (Pa., 1957).
Plaintiffs and X were co-tenants of a tract of land. X's wife
purchased the entire property at a public tax sale. The
lower court decreed reconveyance to plaintiffs of that part
of the land they formerly held as tenants in common
with X. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed. A
co-tenant cannot buy at a tax sale for he stands in a con-
fidential relationship to the other tenants. In light of the
wife's knowledge of the facts and dower interest, public
policy dictates that this disability be extended to her not-
withstanding statutes emancipating married women from
common law disabilities on account of coverture.
RECENT DECISIONS
It has been held consistently that purchase of an out-
standing title or incumbrance by one tenant inured to the
benefit of the other co-tenants, 86 C. J. S., Tenancy in
Common, 442, Sec. 59, even where the tenant purchased
from a stranger who purchased at the sale, 86 C.J.S. 434,
n. 46. These questions have not been squarely presented to
the Maryland court. Assuming, however, that the Mary-
land Court would follow the majority of jurisdictions in
holding that a co-tenant cannot buy in at a tax sale, the
reasons offered by the Pennsylvania court for similarly
restricting the wife would seem to be equally applicable in
this state. Md. Code (1951), Art. 45 does remove the com-
mon law disability of a married woman to hold property.
On the other hand, the Maryland wife does have the same
dower right and presumably would have the same "knowl-
edge of the facts" which was fatal to the wife's assertion of
an independent right to purchase the property in the in-
stant case.
Wire Tapping - Admissibility Of Evidence Procured
Contrary To Statute. Manger v. State, 133 A. 2d 78 (Md.,
1957). This is the first case arising under the recently en-
acted Maryland Wire-Tapping Statute, Md. Code Supp.
(1957), Art. 35, Secs. 100.107. In substance, the Act makes
admissible evidence procured through wire-tapping only if
the wire-tapping was authorized beforehand by a court
order. Police, without an order of court, tapped telephone
wires leading to a certain house and overheard conver-
sations (in which defendants were not involved) concern-
ing the placing of bets on horse races. On this basis, a
search warrant was issued for the premises and executed
upon. The defendants were found in the house and arrested
for violation of the gambling laws. Evidence of bookmak-
ing was seized during the raid and admitted at the trial
over defendants' objection. The conviction was affirmed on
appeal and the evidence thus obtained was held admissible.
The Court assumed for purposes of argument the correct-
ness of the defendants' contention that the statute, if
applicable to the case, made incompetent not only evidence
as to conversations overheard by the unauthorized wire-
tapping, but also evidence obtained as a result of unlaw-
fully overhearing said conversations - in this case, the
evidence seized in the raid. But the Court, pointing to the
analagous situation of search and seizure, stated that the
Wire-Tapping Statute, supra, must be construed with refer-
ence to the Bouse Act, Md. Code Supp. (1957), Art. 35,
Sec. 5, which makes incompetent evidence obtained "by,
19571
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through, or in consequence of" an illegal search or seizure,
in trials for misdemeanors. Rizzo v. State, 201 Md. 206, 209,
210, 93 A. 2d 280 (1952), held that one could not invoke the
Bouse Act if he had no interest in the premises or property
illegally searched or seized. Likewise, one who is not a
participant in the intercepted telephone conversation (un-
less perhaps his own telephone is the one tapped) cannot
invoke the protection of the Wire-Tapping Statute; and
such evidence unlawfully obtained is admissible against
him. The defendants here were not talking on the tele-
phone when the wires were tapped. On admissibility or
evidence obtained by Wire Tapping, see 3 Md. L. Rev. 266
(1939) and 13 Md. L. Rev. 235 (1953).
Workmen's Compensation - Claims By Common Law
Wife And Illegitimate Child. Humphreys v. Marquette
Casualty Company, 95 S. 2d 872 (La., 1957). This was a
Workmen's Compensation proceeding by the common law
wife and illegitimate child of a deceased workman. The
trial court decreed an award only to the child. In affirming
the judgment, the Court of Appeals of Louisiana declared
that a common-law wife is not entitled to compensation
under the statute either as a "surviving widow" or as a
dependent member of the deceased workman's "family",
since common law marriages are not recognized in the state.
However, an illegitimate minor living in the household is
considered a member of the family.
Recovery under the Maryland Act is based solely upon
dependency and not relationship. Md. Code (1939) Art.
101, Sec. 48(4) precluding one from being a dependent
who was not a wife, stepchild, or blood relative of the
deceased, was supplanted by Md. Code (1951) Art. 101,
Sec. 35(8) (d), which left the question of dependency to
the State Industrial Accident Commission. The leading
case of Kendall v. Housing Authority, 196 Md. 370, 76 A.
2d 767 (1950), declared that the effect of this amendment
was to eliminate the requirement that a dependent be re-
lated to the deceased employee by blood or marriage. The
claimant, who cohabited with the deceased for ten years
prior to his fatal injury, but had refused to marry him
because of religious scruples, was awarded compensation.
That common law marriage was not recognized in Mary-
land did not bar recovery. This same Code section also
abolished the requirement that an illegitimate child live in
the household of the deceased workman to be entitled to
compensation. See Brooks v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 199 Md.
29, 85 A. 2d 471 (1952).
